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UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION
IN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
FOR THE
PRESERVATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Hamilton Cooke

By:
I.

INTRODUCTION

The past two decades of international legal history have

been characterized by an increased emphasis upon the importance
of the individual as a proper subject of international law.

Revolutionary changes have occurred in the area of human rights
with the completion of various declarations, covenants, and conventions aimed at the preservation of specific rights within a
framework of international law. The continuing importance and
relevance of this general subject was symbolized by the designation of 1968 as the International Year gor Human Rights in
honor of the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
This paper examines the general subject of individual rights
and duties in international law and, specifically, seeks to
determine the constitutional ability of the United States to participate effectively in the application of these international
-legal rules by ratification of human rights treaties.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Pre-World War I Development

International law consists of rules which govern the relations
between states.1

Traditionally,

only states have had standing to

sue or be sued in international tribunals, and individuals have
had to rely upon the state of their nationality to redress grievances
perpetuated by other states0 2 Nonetheless, individual has, to some
±-HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW I (1940) . The Soviet Union has
remained one of the mcd adamant proponents of absolute sovereignty
and has resisted most efforts to liberalize this concept. See A.
See also
LARSON et al, SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW, cho 17 (1964).
1964 DUKE L0 J. 847 n.5.
2 BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 267
(2d ed. 1962).
An individual
usually lacks procedural capacity to assert rights before any
international tribunal, and thus there may well be doubts whether
he has any rights under international law. It is only the state
of which he is a national that may bring suit in an international
court (or protest through diplomatic channels) against the state

extent, been considered a subject of international law, with rights
and duties derived from it.
The development of Roman law was first characterized by the
jus civile principles which applied only to Roman citizens. 3 Later,
the Roman praetors developed the jus gentium, or the law of nations
which applied to both public and private disputes and established
4
It
definite substantive and procedural rights for individuals.
was a flexible system which governed relations not only between
states but also between individuals in different states. 5 With the
advent of the feudal system and the resulting concept of sovereignty
in the Middle Ages, the law of individual rights underwent a regression from the enlightened approaches of the Roman praetors. 6 This
regression, which emphasized the relations between sovereign heads
of state rather than individuals, formed the basis of modern international law.
Under these traditional concepts, the progress of establishing
international law as a source of individual rights was painfully
slow although it had long been recognized that individuals were
subject to international legal duties. Piracy by an individual has
historically been considered a crime against the law of nations for
of whose conduct the individual complains; hence, the state is
regarded as having the international legal right rather than the

individual. Id. For extensive background information, see
GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 17-23 (1966); EZEJIOFOR, PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 15-51 (1964).
3 GORMLEY, supra
note 2 at 19. Although these principles made
some progress in extending legal personality to a greater number of
citizens in the private law area, the system itself never developed
into a world wide legal order since Roman citizens considered Jus
Civile sacred and thus not applicable to alien peoples.
4The year 367 B.C. marked the creation of the office of praetor
and with it the most significant development in Roman law. The
praetor developed a flexible system of law intended to settle disputes quickly whether the litigants were Roman citizens or aliens.
Indeed, the laws of alien peoples were often applied and over the
years, were integrated into the older Roman law principles. A new
system, the Jus Gentium, thus arose through the efforts of the
praetor to find natural law solutions to pressing legal controversies.
5 GORMLEY,
supra note 2 at 21.
6 Id.
at 18.

7
which international tribunals could administer punishment.

Indeed, individuals have been held criminally responsible for
of the international laws of war and humanity. Both
violations
the United States Supreme court 8 and the International Military

Tribunal at Nuremberg 9 have recognized that international law
subjects individuals to certain defined duties. Although the
international community, especially victors at war, have had little
difficulty imposing these individual duties, sovereign states have
been more hesitant to make the sacrifices necessary for the cor-

responding development of individual rights.
Nevertheless, some concern for the fundamental rights of man
was shown at an early date. Grotius, the founder of the natural
law theory as a basis for international law, recognized the international legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention,1 0 which
justifies intervention by one state into the affairs of another if
the latter is committing abusive acts which are clearly outside the
limits of justice and reason against its subjects. Because of its
limited historical use, however, the dytrine never attained the
Some early treaty prostatus of a rule of international law.
visions also demonstrated existing interest in certain basic rights
of man. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the Treaty of Nymegen
7 BISHOP,

supra note 2, at 265. In United States v. Smith,
5 Wheat. 153, 161-162 (U.S. 1820) it was stated that:
The common law, too, recognizes and punishes piracy as
an offense, not against its own municipal code, but as
an offense against the law of nations (which is a part of

the common law) as an offense against the universal law of
society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race .
8 Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
922 PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 411-589.
1 0 In

his famous work published in 1625, DE JURE BELLI AT PACIS,
translated by Rev. A. C. Campbell t(1814), Grotius defended the
doctrine as:
the reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of
protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as
to exceed the limits of that authority within which the
sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.
STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53

IIEZEJIOFOR, supra, note 2 at 33-35.

(1921).

of 1678, and the Vienna Congress Treaty of 1815 made provisions
for basic religious liberty. The Treaty of Paris of 1856, the
Treaty of Berlin of 1878 and the Treaty of Paris of 1898 undertook to protect minority groups, property rights and other individual civil and political rights. 12 While guaranteeing certain
individual rights, the agreements nevertheless remained basically
international obligations between states and they conferred no
rights which the individual could enforce in an international court.
The rights were limited, ill-defined, and susceptible to repudiation
by a contracting state. 1 3
There were, however, a few instances in which individuals
could maintain an action before an international court. Some
tribunals, such as the Court of the Commission for Navigation of
the Rhine, the European Danube Commission, and the Central
American Court of Justice (1907-1918), provided the "faint begin14
nings of an international legal personality for the individual."
In fact, the Central American Court of Justice was explicitly-given
jurisdiction to hear cases by individuals against states. 1 5
The Inter-War Period
The early claims commissions, such as the United States17
Mexican Mixed Claims Commissions,16 the British-Mexican Commissions
B.

.2Id. at 36-37.
1SId. at 38.
14 Svarlien, International Law and the Individual, 4 J. PUB L.
147

(1955).
15GORMLEY, supra note 2, at 33. The Convention establishing
the court was concluded by five Central American States (Costa
Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala), and although
short lived, it heard ten cases, five of which were brought by
and, of these, four were dismissed as inadmissable
individuals;
and one was decided in favor of the State against the individual,
Since the Convention contained no provision for extension of life,
Nicaragua, against whom two decisions had been rendered, gave a
one year notice of intention to terminate and after unsuccessful
attempts to forestall this action, the court ceased to exist in 1918.

See EZEJIOFOR, supra note 2 at 23 n. 16.
16 This dates
back to the United States-Mexican Claims Convention, July 4, 1868, and continues to be used by the two states as
a device to resolve mutual disagreements such as in the Chamizal
arbitration and the subsequent Convention between the parties which
was an attempt to settle finally this continuing problem. Dep't.
of State Press Release No. 448.
17E o, 5 HACKWORTH, supra, note 1 at 481, 547 (1943).

the German-Mexican Commissions,18 and the many commissions created
by Latin American states and major powers, 1 9
viduals to press claims indirectly against a
established a precedent for the various post
which gave judicial personality to nationals

not only allowed indisovereign state, but
World War I tribunals
of the victorious

powers. The Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunals allowed individuals to petition without the necessity of first obtaining the
representation of their governments, which had been required by
the majority of the prior Commissions. The Anglo-German Commissions
gave individual rights some meaning in international law by pro20
viding procedures for their implementation.
As a result of various post World War I peace treaties, the
trend toward recognizing individual rights as proper subjects of
international law continued. The Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Advisory Opinion of Danzig Railway Case 2 1 held that,
under the Danzig-Polish agreement of October 22, 1921, individuals
were entitled to bring actions based on purely personal claims.
Poland claimed that she was responsible only to the City of Danzig
and not to individual railway employees and, further, that international agreements alone could not create direct rights and
obligations between individuals and states. This position was
rejected by the Court which declared that the treaty in question
had conferred these rights and thus governed the case rather than
general principles of international law.2 2
Another significant decision arose out of a case involving
the Upper Silesian Convention of May, 1922 between Poland and
Germany. The treaty provided for a tribunal which was given jurisdiction to hear claims brought by nationals of either party against
their own states. 2 3 This provision, remarkable in view of past
history,was upheld as valid and effective in Steiner and Gross v.
Polish State, 2 4 an action brought against Poland by two Polish
nationals. The tribunal found that the intent of the Convention
was to protect private rights, and that the necessary jurisdiction
25
had thus been conferred on the Court.
1 8 Ido

at 833.
International Arbitration: Certain Contemporary
Developments, RECUEIL DES COURS (1964).
0 GORMLY, supra note 2, at 38.
2
2 1 PCoI.Jo Ser. B, No. 15 (1928).
2 2 1d at 17.
23ORMLY, supra note 2 at 41.
241 Decisions of Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal at 1-36
(March, 1928).
2 5 Cf. the decision of Chorzow Factory Case, P.CoI.J., Ser A, No.
17, 27-28 (1928) which held:
International law does not prevent one State from granting to
another the right to have recourse to international arbitral
1 9 -spafford,

Finally, to provide protection for some twenty-five million
frequently abused members of various groups living in central and
Eastern Europe, the principal treaty at Versailles permitted the
imposition of obligations with respect to the protection of
26
minorities by separate treaty upon the new and enlarged states.
As a result, many Minorities Treaties were signed during the Peace
Conference between the principal allied powers and Poland, Greece,
Romania and several others. 2 7 The treaties contained general provisions for complete protection of life, liberty, religious freedom and other civil and political rights. While the scheme as a
whole was ineffective, the treaties did provide striking evidence
of the continued concern of international law for the basic rights
of mankind.
Post World War II Developments
1. The Nuremberg Trials
The increased recognition of the applicability of international
legal norms to the individual was advanced markedly at the Trial of
Major War Criminals at Nuremberg. The genesis of the trial arose
in the joint declaration of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill on
November 1, 1943 warning that those German officers and Nazi
leaders who had been responsible for the atrocious crimes and
massacres of the war should be judged and punished at the conclusion of the war. 2 8 Following this declaration, the London
Agreement of August 8, 1945, between the United States, Great
Britain, France and the Soviet Union, established an International
Military Tribunal to conduct the trial of the major war criminals
or of those whose offenses had no particular geographical location.
A part of this Agreement was the Charter of the Tribunal which
defined its jurisdiction, applicable law and functions. Article 6
of this Charter gave jurisdiction to hear cases of specified crimes
for which individual duties and responsibilities would attach and
included Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity.2 9 Twenty-two individual defendants were indicted under
C.

tribunals in order to obtain the direct award to nationals
of the latter State of compensation for damage suffered by
them as a result of infractions of international law by the
first State. ...

See also GORMLEY, supra note 2 at 41 n. 27.
2 6 EZIJIOFOR, supra note 2 at 39 n. 13.
2 7 A complete list of these treaties is contained at Id at 40
and n. 16.
2 8 See BISHOP,
supra note 2 at 839.
2 9 These provisions were stated as follows:
(a) Crimes against peace: Namely, planning preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a
war in violation of international treaties, agreements

Article 6; nineteen of these were found guilty on various
counts.30
Because the Tribunal was required to apply the law as set
out in the Charter, 3 1 the validity of the trial as a major precedent in the area of individual rights and duties depends on two
questions: whether the Agreement and Charter correctly set out
the principles of international law which had existed prior to
the Agreement, and whether the Agreement itself was international
law. As to the former, it is submitted that the Charter brought
together in one document a collection of many offenses which had
been crimes or illegal acts in prior international law and labeled
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War Crimes: Namely, violations of laws or customs
of war. Such violations shall include, but not be
limited to murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during
the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.
CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, arto6.
3 0 The following
defendants were found guilty:
Georing, Hess,
Von Ribbentrop, GenoKeitel, Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Frank, Frick,
Streicher, Funk, Adm. Doenitz,Adm. Raeder, Von Schirach, Sauckel,
Gen. Jodl, Seyss-Inquart, Speer, Von Neurath and Bormann (tried in
absentia).
The following defendants were acquitted:
Schacht, Von
Papen and Fritzsche. For complete chart showing exact findings, see
BISHOP, supra note 2 at 858-59.
3 1 The Tribunal
said: "These provisions (the provisions of
Article 6 of the Charter) are binding upon the Tribunal as the
law to be applied to the case."
judgment at 3; and
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the
Agreement and Charter and the crimes coming within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for which there
shall be individual responsibility, are set out in
Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and
binding upon the Tribunal.
Id at 38.

these acts under the three categories of Crimes Against Peace,
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Thus, while the defendants may not have recognized the labels of the various offenses,
their substantive nature had long been outlawed either by specific treaty provisions or under general principles of natural
law or customary international law. For example, several
authorities existing prior to World War II recognized the illegality of war as an instrument of international politics. The
preamble of a declaration unanimously adopted by the League of
Nations on September 24, 1927, stated, "a war of aggression can
never serve as a means of settling international disputes and is,
in consequence, an international crime,"132 and Article 1 declared,
33
"all wars of aggression are, and shall always be prohibited".
Later in the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of
August 27, 1928, generally known as the Pact of Paris or the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, 34 wars of aggression were specifically out35
lawed, This treaty was ratified by Germany, Italy and Japan.
Thus, substantive law concerning crimes against peace existed
prior to the Nuremberg Charter.
No specific international norms concerning individual
responsibility were recognized prior to the Charter. The Tribunal
and prosecution staffs escaped this difficulty with an expression
of common sense:
Crimes against international law are committed
by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes
of international law be
can the provisions
36
enforced.
A similar analysis of the categories War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity indicates that the Tribunal was attempting to
prove that the Nuremberg Agreement was simply restating established
law in a new form. All of the acts labeled War Crimes in
Article 6(b) of the Charter had been outlawed in the Fourth Hague
Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1929, and individual responsibility had clearly been established in municipal
jurisdictions. The lack of specific precedent for individual
responsibility in international courts was given little significance,
and in this regard the trial did in fact set forth a new principle.
32 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. No. 54 at 155 (1927).
33
Id.
34-94 League of Nations Treaty Series 57 et seq. (1929).
35 For partial text of treaty, see NORGAARD, THE POSITION OF
THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 n. 87. The validity of
this pact was strongly attacked by German defense lawyers at the
Nuremberg Trial because it had never been enforced or followed by
a majority of nations. Id at 207-08.
3 6 Judgment
at 41.

The Nuremberg judgment was most creative in finding retroactive
law concerning crimes against humanity. The Tribunal limited
itself in that regard to clearly illegal acts perpetrated in
conjunction with War Crimes. While some prior authority on this
count was advanced by the prosecution to the Court, i.e. municipal
laws in all civilized nations against murder, the use of the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention, etc., the Tribunal actually formulated
for the first time this international crime and imposed individual
responsibility for it.
The Charter and the Tribunal's judgment made a valuable contribution to international law by bringing together crimes already
clearly established in the positivist theory of international law
and by fixing responsibility upon the actual perpetrators. The
solid rock of state sovereignty and the protection it affords
international war crimes were resoundingly denounced when the
Tribunal said:
On the other hand, the very essence of the
Charter is that individuals have international
duties which transcend the national obligations
of obedience imposed by the individual state.
He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain
immunity while acting in persuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing
action moves outside
its competance under inter37
national law
In addition, the Tribunal and Charter, by establishing and
enforcing the count on Crimes Against Humanity, recognized the
existing natural law views regarding the basic worth and dignity of
the individual. This latter step may not have had the support of
clear legal precedent, but in view of the tragic results of
genocide, it was both proper and necessary to attempt to establish
these principles as rules of international law. Therefore,
assuming the Charter was itself international law and that the
Tribunal was international in name as well as in substance, thi
major event marked a tremendous advance in the resurgence of natural
law principles as a method of insuring protection of basic human
rights. The international community actively began to seek methods
of insuring that such horrors would never again be allowed to
occur.
2.

The United Nations
a. Basic Principles
During World War II, various declarations such as the Atlantic
Charter of August 12, 1941 between Roosevelt and Churchill stressed
371d.

the need for protection of basic human rights to insure the future
of world peace. Many private organizations and individuals urged
the promulgation of an International Bill of Rights by an international organization to be formed at the end of the war. The
question of human rights received considerable attention at the
Dunbarton Oaks meeting at Washington in 1944 where major Allied
powers met to consider the formation of such an organization to
insure peace in the world. The culmination of these many efforts
came in the Charter of the new United Nations which emerged from
the San Francisco Conference.
The preamble to the Charter emphasizes the determination of
the people of the world
o . .to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small. .o38

One of the major purposes of the Organization is
. . the achievement of international cooperation
in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
39
distinction to race, sex, language or religion.
Futhermore, the General Assembly is bound to initiate studies and
make recommendations "for the purpose of assisting in the realizationof human rights and fundamental freedoms". 4 0 The United Nations, in
order to create stability in economic and social fields, shall
promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all"o 4 1 Finally, in this connection, the
Economic and Social Council of the Organization is authorized to
make recommendations to the General Assembly and specialized
to set up
agencies concerning respect for human rights 4 2 and
43
commissions for the promotion of human rights.
Standing alone, these provisions, other than showing a central
theme of the Organization, have dubious legal effect. It is clear
that Article 55 requires that states shall promote respect for and
observance of human rights. Article 56 strengthens this obligation in that
All members pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55.
The Charter's effectiveness in insuring protection of rights, however,
is hampered by two factors. First, there are no implementation
3 8 U,1T%

CHARTER, Preamble
art.1(3).
art.13 (1) (b).
art.55(c).
4 2 1d,
art.62(2).
4 3 Id,
art°68.

3 9 Id,
4 0 _d,
4 17d,

provisions in the Charter; and second, these rights are not
specifically defined and thus it is not certain what they are.
Another stumbling block has been the efforts of some to discount the United Nations' ability to take effective measures in this
field. Article 2(7) of the Charter provides that:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter, but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
Using this provision, detractors of the United Nations' competence to
effect the insurance of human rights argue that protection of human
rights has traditionally been governed by domestic law and thus
article 2(7) precludes any discussion by the General Assembly, Economic
and Social Council or other organs concerning any alleged breaches by
44
a state of its obligations to respect and promote human rights.
The resolution of this argument depends upon the interpretation of
"intervention" and "matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state". Intervention has traditionally referred to
dictatorial interference and not interference "pure and simple". 4 5
If the enforcement measures of Chapter VII are considered to be
technical or dictatorial intervention involving the use of force,
then they are specifically excluded by Article 2(7).
Thus the
enforcement measures of Chapter VII must be interpreted to mean
46
something less than dictatorial interference.
More important, under the second major guideline of Article 2
(7), human rights are probably not a matter "essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction" of a state. Historically such matters have
been handled domestically, but an accumulation of factors including
the deep concern for human rights following World War II, the
Charter provisions and other treaties which have made human rights
the subject of international obligations, and the possibility that
a policy or act committed by a state involving denial of human rights
could cause repercussions threatening world peace, lend overwhelming
support to the proposition that human rights are now an international
concern. While most aspects of the subject will be handled domestically, the entire human rights movement has been a revolutionary step
in the development of international law, and technical interpretation
of Article 2,(7) would neither harmonize with this trend nor allow
4 4 Kunz,
43 A.Jo
4 5 OPPENHEIM,

317 (1949).
INTERNATIONAL-LAW 305 (2d ed. 1962).
See also
EZEJIOFOR,supra
note
2
at
60
n.
16.
4 6 Gilmour,
The Meaning of "Intervene" Within Article 2(7) of
the United Nations Charter, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 330 (1967).

nations to participate effectively in this area. Certainly
Article 2(7) is not meant to short-circuit the powers and obligations set forth in Articles 10, 13, 55 and 56 concerning discussions, studies and recommendations regarding human rights.
Whatever the effect of Article 2(7) on other matters, it should
not affect the competence of the United Nations in the field of
human rights.
b. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The United Nations' first major achievement in the area of
human rights came in 1948 when the Commission on Human Rights,
a part of the Economic and Social Council, prepared a draft
Declaration on Human Rights which together with a Covenant on
Human Rights and Measures for Implementation, was to constitute
the International Bill of Rights. 4 7 After extensive debate the
Declaration was adopted and proclaimed unanimously on December 10,
1948.48 Finally, there was an instrument defining the rights
referred to in the Charter. The Declaration provided that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person; to
recognition as a person before the- law; to effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating fundamental
rights;
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; to freedom
of movement and to leave any country including his own, and to
return to it; to seek and enjoy asylum; to nationality; to
personal property; to freedom of opinion and expression; to
peaceful assembly and association; and to take part in the
government of one's country. In addition, it provided that no
one shall be held in slavery or servitude, subjected to torture
or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, or interference with his
privacy, home or correspondence. The Declaration gave men and
women of full age the right to marry and have a family. It entitled
everyone to all the rights and freedoms set forth without distinction
of any kind and to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal.4 9
Several articles also dealt with economic, social and cultural
rights including the right of everyone to social security, to work
under just and favorable conditions, to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests, to rest and leisure, to an adequate
standard of living, to education, to participation in the cultural
life of the community, to enjoment of arts and to share in scientific
5
advancement and its benefits.
4 7EZEJIOFOR,supra
4 8 Doc. A/777.

note 2 at 85.
It was submitted as "Universal Declaration on
Human Rights", see UoNoY.Bo 465 (1948). Although no vote was cast
against the Declaration, the following states abstained:
Byelorussia,
Czechoslovakia, Honduras, Poland, Ukraine, Soviet Russia, South
Africa4 9 and Yugoslovia. Saudi Arabia was absent.
Art. 1-21.
50
Art. 22-27.

These provisions were the first step toward formal recognition
of basic human rights and freedoms which all nations would strive
to achieve. Although the Declaration was not intended to create
binding legal obligations 51 it was evidence of world concern in
this area. It also provided a political, though not a legal,
tool to persuade all states to keep their own affairs in harmony
with its principles.
c.

U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter
referred to as CP Covenant), along with its companion Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to
as ESC Covenant) and an Optional Protocol were adopted by the
General Assembly on December 16, 1966, after twelve years of
discussion, as the projected follow-up to the Universal
52
Declaration
Although it had been contemplated originally that there would
be only one covenant forming an International Bill of Rights, two
covenants were prepared because of the varying nature of the rights
involved. The ESC Covenant objectives will have to be achieved
blEven though the document was hailed by Mrs. Roosevelt,
American delegate and Chairman for the Commission on Human Rights,
as possibly the "Magna Carta for all mankind" U.N. GEN. ASS. OFF. REC.,
3rd Sess., Pt. 1 at 962 (1948), the American delegate at the Third
Committee recognized that:
The draft declaration was not a treaty or international
it was
agreement and did not impose legal obligations;
rather a statement of basic principles of inalienable
human rights setting up a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations. Although it was not
legally binding, the declaration would nevertheless have
considerable weight. Id, 3rd Committee at 32
Indeed, Mrs. Roosevelt recognized this fact also:
In giving our approval to the Declaration today, it is
of primary importance that we keep clearly in mind the
basic character of the document. It is not a treaty;
it is not an international agreement. It is not and
does not purport to be a statement of law or legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of
human rights and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by formal vote of its
members, and to serve as a common standard of achievement-for all peoples of all nations. 19 DEP'T STATE BULL.
751 (1948).
5 2 G.A. Res.
2200 A,21 U.N. GEN. ASS. OFF. REC. Supp.16 at 49,
U.N. DOC A/6316 (1966). See generally Starr,o International
Protection of Human Rights and the United Nations Covenants, 1967
WIS. L. REV. 863, at 889 n. 114,

slowly; legislation will not automatically bring them into
fruition. The CP Covenant, in comparison, envisions rapid
steps for enforcement of fairly specific civil and political
rights through legislation.
d.

Specific U, N. Treaties and Resolutions

The General Assembly has promulgated several significant
treaties in the field of human rights. Among these was the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948), 53 which was based on the principles of
Nuremberg and which provided that persons committing the crime
of genocide "shAll be punished, whether they are constitutionally
''
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals, 54

by local tribunals in the jurisdiction where the acts occurred or
by an international penal tribunal. 5 5 Other conventions promulgated by the General Assembly and now in force include those
relating to the Status of Refugees (1954); Stateless Persons
(1960); Political Rights or Women (1954); Nationality of
Married Women (1958); Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for
Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1964); International
Right of Correction (1962); Slavery Convention of 1926 as amended
(1955) and Protocol (1953); and Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, Slave Trade, Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery (1957). Additional conventions not yet in
force include the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights with Optional Protocol; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the Convention on
Reduction of Statelessness. The General Assembly is in the process
of adopting Conventions on Elimination of Religious Intolerance
and Freedom of Information. Furthermore, the General Assembly
has investigated apartheid in the Republic of South Africa; and
the Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Rhodesia in
1966.56
Using the right of individual petition, which exists under
the Trusteeship Council, 5 7 UNESCO and the International Labor
Organization (ILO) have also made great advances. UNESCO's
Convention against Discrimination in Education in 1960 with its
implementing Protocol (1962) provides for an investigatory and
5 3 For

text, see Res°No. 260 (III)A, U.N. GEN. ASS. OFF. REC.
3rd Sess. (1), Resolutions at 174; U.N. Doc.no. A/810.
54Arto 4.
55
Art. 6.
5656 DEP'T STATE BULL.73 at 77-78 (Jan. 1967).
5 7 For
a good example of the controversies which can arise
under this system, see the South West Africa Cases, I.C.J. Rep
319 (1962).

conciliatory commission to receive complaints from one state
espousing the claims of a foreign national having no connection
with the complaining state. 5 8 More significantly, the International Labor Organization has drafted more than one hundred and
twenty conventions which impose legal obligations concerning
human rights on the participating governments. 5 9 ILO member
states may also file petitions on behalf of foreign nationals
who otherwise have no effective means of redress through municipal fora
because of their own local law.6 0 This mans that
the traditional nationality test 61 of international law has
been rejected by the ILO and the use of inter-state petitions
has become a powerful weapon for human rights protection.
Individual petitions for redress are allowed indirectly by
the ILO. While the ILO limits the right of petition to private
groups and organizations who petition on behalf of individuals,
an individual would have little trouble in finding a labor union
to bring the suit for him.
This has led to the assertion that
"in reality, the individual is emerging as a subject under the
case law of the ILOh"o0Z

Of all truly international organizations,

the ILO has made the greatest advances, especially in the procedural
context of the protection of human rights. 6 3
3.

Regional Agreements
a.

The European Convention of Human Rights

The most remarkable advances in the area of human rights protection have come at the regional level. The most important of
these has been the formation in 1949 of the Council of Europe with
its adoption in 1952 of the European Convention of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedomso 6 4 The purpose of the Council was the achievement of greater unity among its members to safeguard and to implement
5 8 GORMLEY,
supra note
5 9 See International

2 at 51.
Labour Standards 38-40 (1961) for a listing
of conventions. See also GORMLEY, supra note 2, at 53 n. 31 and 32.
6 0 Ghana v.
Portugal XLV ILO Off. Bul. Supp II,April 1963.
6 1 This relates
to the traditional rule that a state may only
press the claims of its own nationals in an international tribunal.
See Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4.
2 GORMLEY,
supra note 2 at 58.
63
1doat 61.
6 4 For text,
see 45 AM.J. INTL. L. SUPP. 25 (1951). The following
nations are parties to the Convention and Protocol: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, German Federal Republic, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom. Information is found in EZEJIOFOR, supra note 2.

the ideals and principles including protection of human rights,
which were the common heritage of the European states.
The strong influence and importance of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is most evident in the rights and
freedoms guaranteed in the European Convention. All of the
substantive provisions of the European Convention, with one
exception, are identical to those of the Declaration. The
exception provides the right to seek an effective local remedy
for the violation of any rights and freedoms set out in the
treaty notwithstanding that the violation is committed by a
person acting in official capacity. 6 5 Implementation machinery
consists of the Commission, which is open to any party including
an individual if the relevant state party has recognized its
competency, and the Court of Human Rights. 6 6 The Court of Human
Rights was established to insure that a final determination of the
question of breach of obligations under the system did not rest
with a political body which might render only political decisions.6 7
The Court interprets and applies the Convention in cases referred to
it by those contracting parties which have accepted jurisdiction or
68
by the Commission.
With the creation of these two important bodies, the parties
to the European Convention have taken a remarkable step. By
creating these supranational organs, separate and apart from the
control of member states, these states have agreed to limit their
absolute sovereignty by voluntarily accepting a minimum standard of
human rights protection. The critical factor is that such action
can and is being taken through cooperation and collaboration among
governments. Procedural weaknesses, such as the highly restrictive
tests for admissibility of private petitions 9 still appear in the
Convention machinery. Nevertheless, this effective step on the
regional level serves as an encouraging illustration of what can
be done through international cooperation.
b.

Other Agreements

Outside of Europe, other regional steps have been initiated.
Following the lead of the Council of Europe, the Foreign Ministers
b"Art. 13 (Convention); art. 5 (Protocol).
66
Art. 19.
6 7 EZEJIFOR, supra note 2 at 121.
6 8 Art. 45.
6 9 At present, the Commission has examined over 2,000 petitions
and of these, only 30 have been considered on the merits. GORMLEY,
supra note 2 at 93.l. But see, the Lawless Case, 3 YB Human Rights
492 (1961) where the Court of Human Rights held that an individual
through the Commission, can now obtain a full hearing before the
Court since the Commission is deemed a "party" just as States are.

of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1959 authorized the
drafting of an Inter-American Convention on Human Rights 70 The
draft, calling for the establishment of an Inter-American Commission
and an Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 7 1 is still being
considered 72 The Council of the OAS has proceeded, however, to
create an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights prior to
approval of the draft. This Commission is restricted in implementation powers to investigation and publication of findings,
but has, since its inception in 1960, received and registered more than
five hundred communications concerning claims of violation of rights
and has addressed a specific recommendation to the government of
Cuba. 7 3 Since its effectiveness depends upon the willingness of the
state parties to accept binding obligations through ratification of
the draft Convention, the Commission is likely to fail unless the
74
United States relaxes its opposition.
Progress in other regions of the world has been even more
limited although the idea of regional agreements has reached the
planning stage in several areas.75
III.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION

The ESC Covenant

The constitutional and policy considerations of United States
participation in international agreements for the preservation of
human rights will be considered with respect to the ESC Covenant
and the CP Covenant. But because there is a more realistic
possibility and need for ratification of the CP Covenant, it will
be discussed in detail and the ESC Covenant covered only briefly.
The ESC Covenant contains thirty-one articles which primarily
define and amplify corresponding provisions in the Universal
7 0 Declaration

of Santiago, Chile, (1959), OAS, Fifth Meeting
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
7 1 Id at Part II, art. 34.
72 For full discussion of this Covenant and human rights in
Latin America, see Cabranes, Human Rights and Non-Intervention in
the Inter-American System 65 MICH L. REV. 1147 at 1164.
7 3 Id.
at 1169-71.
741. at 1179. From the beginning, the U.S. announced it would
not be able to adhere to an American human rights convention or
accept jurisdiction of a Human Rights Court. Fifth Meeting of
Forei n Ministers, Final Act 18-19 (1959).
-5The Organization of African Unity, in 1961, called for study
of the possibility of adopting an African Convention of Human Rights.
See 3 JOUR. INT'L COMM. OF JURISTS 9 (1961). Also, a suggestion has
been made for the creation of a Commonwealth Court of Human Rights
in Great Britain. See EZEJIOFOR, supra note 2, at 145.

Declaration.° 6 In part it provides such rights as: the right to
work under just and favorable conditions; the right to strike;
the right to social security; protection and assistance for the
family; an adequate standard of living; physical and mental
health; education; and enjoyment of the benefits of science and
culture. These rights are recognized only as goals for progressive
achievement in light of a state's "available resources". 7 7 Implementation machinery is78 limited to a reporting obligation on the
part of party states
While most of the rights enumerated in the ESC Covenant are
not found in our federal or state constitutions they are largely
covered by federal and state legislation; and because these
broadly defined rights would probably be a legitimate federal concern, the constitutionality of entering this treaty might not be
overly complex.
B.

The CP Covenant

The CP Covenant contains basic "hard core" rights, and its
adoption in the United States would involve the possibility of
federal encroachment into areas of state concern. Consequently,
an-examination of the CP Covenant will reveal clearly the constitutional and policy considerations which would affect a decision
in international agreements for
by the United States to participate
79
the preservation of human rights
1.

The Substantive Provisions of the Covenant

The CP Covenant contains approximately twenty-four articles
dealing with specified rights. 8U A majority of the rights
enunciated are similar to those found in our federal and state
constitutions. 8 1 There are, however, several substantive rights
which find no counterpart in American Law, 8 2 and a few basic rights
contained in the federal constitution are not included in the
76For full text of ESC Covenant, see 8 JOUR OF INT'L COMM OF
53 (1967).
JURISTS
7 7 ESC Covenant,
arts. 6-13, 15.
781d art. 16-21.
7 9 redit must
be given to the following article which provided
extremely thoughtful analysis and whose organizational format was
so beneficial that it was adopted for this paper: Chafee, Federal
and State Powers under the U.N. Covenant on Human Rights, 1951
WIS.o REVo 389.
Most of these rights are simply definitions and amplifications of corresponding provisions in the Universal Declaration.
8 lArticles 10, 7, 8, 9, 12(1), 12(2), 12(4), 26, 14, 15,
18,
19, 21 22.
82Articles 1, 9(5), 14(6), 15, 20, 23, 27.

that its purpose is to set
Covenant. 8 3 The document makes clear
84
rights.
human
basic
for
standard
a minimum
Certain specific rights are accompanied by qualifications that
allow general derogations or limitations when a question of protection of others' rights or of the national security, public
In addition,
order or public health and morals is concerned.
Article 4(1) allows a general derogation in times of "a public
emergency which threatens the life of5 a nation and the existence
8
of which is officially proclaimed".
Under tests used by the United States, 8 6 the CP Covenant is
not a self-executing treaty. If it were self-executing, and therefore required no implementing legislation to give its provisions
ifmdiate internal effect, its ratification might nullify the many
state and federal statutes dealing with human rights which are
inconsistent. Self-execution also might fail to fill certain gaps
in our system of rights protection. On the other hand, legislation
which follows and implements the Covenant can better serve to eliminate specifically the injustices of past legislation. In
addition, implementing legislation can, if so desired, provide evn
greater rights than those given by the treaty.
The Covenant creates a Human Rights Committee to implement
the treaty provisions. This Committee, composed of eighteen
members, has the major function of receiving reports from the
State Parties regarding the measures taken to implement the treaty
and the progress made for protection of the enumerated rights.
The Committee can also receive complaints from parties who allege
that another party is not fulfilling the obligations of the treaty.
This can only be.done, however, if both parties recognize the
competence of the Committee, If so, the Committee can receive
evidence, conduct investigations, make recommendations to the
parties and submit a report of its findings. 8 7 If nosolution is
reached, the Committee can, with prior consent of the parties,
appoint a Conciliation Commission whose members serve in a personal
capacity. This Commission will submit a final report to the
Committee with recommedations for a solution. The parties are
not bound to accept this decision.
Following the lead of the European Convention, the Optional
Protocol allows the right of individual petition contingent upon
83E.go, Prohibition on taking private property without just
compensation, U.S. CONST. amendoV:
and right to jury trial in
criminal cases,
Idoamend.VI.
8 4 CP Covenant, art. 5,
8 5 Id, art. 4(2).
8 bSee Foster v.
Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829) which formulated
the basic test that courts will look to the treaty itself to
determine if it involves a promise to enact legislation. See also
Chafee, supra note 79 at 397.
8 7 CoPo Covenant, art, 41.

a prior declaration of the Committee's competence by the accused
state having personal jurisdiction over the individual. These
petitions must then meet certain basic requirements as to form
and exhaustion of remedies. 8 8 If this Protocol enters into force,
it will mark the first global recognition of the right of individual petition to protect violations of human rights and could mark
a dramatic procedural step in this expanding area.
These implementation procedures are relatively weak and
possess characteristics of compromise to insure wider acceptance.
Many nations are uncertain of its effects and are thus naturally
reluctant to surrender their sovereignty until there is some indication of how effective this revolutionary program will be. While
this machinery is only a start, it is not worthless; conciliation
is still one of the most effective ways of settling disputes in
international law. The practical chances of a government's
agreeing to "mend its ways" are more likely if the persuasion is
sincere and well-reasoned and not forced upon a government against
its will. In effect, the Committee and Conciliation Commission
act as "Ombudsmen", a highly acclaimed method of settling disputes.8 9
The two bodies serve as "readily accessible, professionally qualified,
wholly detached critics, to inquire objectively into asserted
administrative shortcomings; [they are] advisors, not commanders,
who rely on recommendation, not on compulsion". 9 0 While this is
not as attractive as a Court of Human Rights, it is an effective
method and a good start toward the universal protection of human
rights.
a.

Present Status of United States Protection of Human
Rights--Without The Covenant

In the absence of the treaty power, the Federal Government already has enormous power and jurisdictional control over many of
the rights in the Covenant. To the extent of this present federal
protection, the Covenant would in no way encroach on states' rights.
The chief source of this power is section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment which gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article", which include the
portion of Section 1 which reads:
Nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, nor deny any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of
(Emphasis supplied).
the laws.
8 8 0pt.

Protocol, art. 1.
Newman, Ombudsmen and Human Rights:
Provisions. 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 951 (1967).
9 0 GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS 422, 436
8 9 See

the New U.N. Treaty
(1966).

This provision clearly covers many of the substantive areas
in the Covenant. Accordingly, Congress can pass a federal law
forbidding state denial of "life" without due process (article 6)
or of "liberty" which embraces a prohibition of torture or
physical suffering (article 7); arbitrary arrest or detention
(article 9), excluding the Covenant right to compensation; illegal expulsion of aliens (article 13); the fair trial provisions
(article 14) and freedom of thought and religion (article 18);
speech and press (article 19) and of peaceful assembly (article 21).
In addition, the fourteenth amendment "equal protection" clause
corresponds to article 26 of the Covenant. Thus, nine of the
Covenant rights are plainly covered by the fourteenth amendment
alone. Others, such as article 16 concerning recognition of
everyone as a person before the law, are worded in general terms
which could easily fit into the "liberty" or "equal protection"
provisions.
Aside from the fourteenth amendment other rights of the
Covenant are specifically covered by federal law. Article 8,
abolishing slavery and compulsory labor, corresponds to the
thirteenth amendment. Most of article 15 corresponds to the ex
post facto provision in the Constitution. 9 1 The universal suffrage rights of article 25 are covered by the fifteenth and
nineteenth amendments, and the provision of article 10 regarding
the humane treatment of prisoners has a counterpart in the eighth
amendment.
Other articles are indirectly covered by existing federal law.
Article 12 provisions concerning freedom to enter or leave one's
country and prohibiting arbitrary exile of a citizen from his
nation are purely national matters wich Congress has always
regulated without need of a treaty.
The companion provision
regarding liberty of movement within the country and freedom to
choose a residence are protected by the interstate commerce
clause. 9 3 Because of this clause, it is not proper for one state
to forbid an individual or certain groups from coming into the
state and settling down° 9 4 Most likely, state action restricting
movement within a state would be deemed a denial of "liberty"
under the fourteenth amendment and therefore invalid unless valid
reasons existed such as public health, safety or morals requiring
such restriction on freedom. 9 5 The Supreme Court has held, in
addition, that state or local officials cannot attempt to segregate
the residence of minority groups 9 6 or enforce racially restrictive
91U.So CONSTo art. 1 §§ 9(3) & 10.
9 2 See 8 USC
§ 1101 (1953) et. seq. for federal laws on general
subject of immigration, naturalization, aliens, etc.
93UoSo CONSTo art. 1, § 8.
9 4 Edwards
v. California 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
9 5 0f.
Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
9 6 Buchanan v. Worley 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1948).

covenants, 9 7 and Congress has, through use of the commerce power,
recently approved open housing legislation 9 8 which will bring
within federal control most violations which might occur under
article 12.
Another right of the Covenant, that of freedom of association
including the right to join labor unions, found in article 22, is
federally protected throug the commerce clause under which the
Wagner Act was sustained.9
That the connection with interstate
1 00
prevent federal control.
not
will
commerce is miniscule
A majority of the provisions of the Covenant thus fall within
the permissible scope of federal power. Others are not clearly
within such scope. These provisions relate to privacy and defa-

mation (article 17); imprisonment for debt I0 1 (article 11); selfdeterminati6n (article 1); propaganda for war (article 20); right to
marry (article 23); protectioA of children (article 24); and protection of minorities (article 27). While some of these rights are
arguably either directly or indirectly within the scope of federal
protection, the significance of this list is its brevity.
There is a decissive difference, however, between the
Covenant and the Condtitution. The Covenant relates to the type
of violations which are outlawed and forbids violations by any
person, but United States federal protection often extends only
to certain rights which have been violated by state and local
officials, i.e. "state action", since the power of the fourteenth
amendment does not cover violations committed by private persons.
For example, the Covenant requires a pledge to enact appropriate
legislation if needed to implement and protect certain rights such
as the right to "life". In the United States such right is
protected by murder statutes in every state. However, with
certain exceptions concerning murder of a president1 0 2 and conspiracy to violate a person's civil rights, 1 0 3 there is no
federal murder statute, which means that the federal government
lacks the power to insure prosecution of private persons committing
murder. At present, the federal government can only hope for
state prosecution. Therefore, because of this lack of power, the
federal government cannot technically meet the requirement of the
Covenant concerning assurances of effective remedies and thus
might violate the treaty if a state refused to prosecute a private
person for murder. To correct this situation and to prevent the
possibility of violating international law, the federal government
might be forced to enact a federal murder statute if it chose to
91Shelley v. Kraemer 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
9818 USC § 801 et seq; Public Law 90-284.
WEEK 89.
9 9

NoLoRoBo v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

See also 36 U.S.L.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).

10UWickard v, Filburn 317 U.S.o 111 (1942).
1 0 1 This probably would be a 14th amendment "liberty" and thus
be covered, though this cannot-be asserted absolutely.
10218 USC §1751.
10318 USC §241.
28

ratify the treaty. Many believe that, because such action may be
necessary, ratification would require too much sacrifice and
alteration of our system. This problem warrants serious study but
is not of such nature as to foreclose categorically the desirability of ratification.
Actually, the gulf between the Covenant and Constitution with
respect to private interference with human rights is not as wide
as it appears. First, some of the rights enumerated can only be
violated by governments or interfered with by legal agencies.
These include the rights protected in article 26 on equal protection,
and article 16 on recognition before the law. Second, other rights
are of such nature that it is likely that only a government would be
able to violate them. They include immunity from imprisonment
for debt (article 14) ; freedom of movement, entry and departure
(article 12); prohibition of ex post facto laws (article 15); and
These two groups do not require
universal sufferage (article 25).
additional federal legislation since possible infringements will
realistically occur only as a result of state action and thus come
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. A third group,
however, contains rights which could be violated by both private
persons and officials. It is only here that the Covenant would
require new legislation insuring whatever protection does not
presently exist. This third group, where protection against private
interference is needed, includes rights to life (article 6);
against torture or cruel punishment (article 7); against slavery
against arbitrary arrest or detention (article 9)z
(article 8);
to liberty of movement and change of residence (article 12);
privacy and defamation (article 17); and to freedom of religion,
speech, assembly and association (articles 18, 19, 21, 22).
practically, there is little probability of private interference
with many of these rights. Most interference would be by police
and government officials. But some rights,like life1 04and privacy
could quite possibly be violated by private persons.
In conclusion, the domestic powers of Congress over human
rights are already considerable, and the gap between present human
rights protection and that called for by the Covenant is much
narrower than would appear initially. Certain areas do, without
doubt, lie outside the present scope of federal regulation.
On the other hand, the late Zecheriah Chafee, an eminent
authority on the Constitution, contends that in most instances,
because of the commerce clause, fourteenth amendment and other
provisions, Congress has the power to legislate as to almost all
rights in the Covenant and to cure any deficiences in state pro10 5
tection and prosecution.
4 U4

The present federal civil rights acts extend to many of
these violations, especially when there is present the element
of conspiracy to violate civil rights.
105Chafeesupra note 81 at 412.

3.

The Scope of the Treaty Power

The extent of federal power to protect human rights is impressive. Still, to meet the treaty obligations, the federal
government must pass statutes which insure that all of the rights
in the Covenant have ultimate federal protection even though day
to day protection may remain with the states. The question, therefore, is whether the treaty power gives Congress the right to pass
statutes insuring federal protection of the enumerated rights.
a.

The Constitution

The Constitution itself is of relatively little help in
defining this scope or providing insight into the nature of the
treaty power. It expressly gives the power to the president in
article II, section 2.
He shall have the Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur,..
This provision indicates the concern of our founding fathers that
the country present a united front when dealing in international
relations, and it is reemphasized in article I, section 10's
explicit denial of states' power to make treaties. While some
exceptions to this latter provision have been made in cases of
interstate compacts having Congressional approval, I 0 6 it has always
been the federal government, represented by the executive branch, which
has negotiated and concluded treaties with foreign powers.
Furthermore, Congress has the power to implement non-selfexecuting treaties, such as the Covenant, by legislation. This is
found in article I, section 8(18) which reads:
The Congress shall have Power...To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into.Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer -thereof.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The emphasized portion plainly includes the treaty power of the
President and the Senate. In addition, treaties are included in
the "supremacy clause" of article VI(2):
1LbLandes v. Landes 153 NoYoS. 2d 14 (1956); Howell v. Port
of New York Authority 34 F. Supp. 797 (N.J. 1940); Hazelton v.
Murray, 121 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1956); But see Anthony v. Veatch, 220
B2d 493 rehearing denied 221 P2d 575, appeal dismissed 340 U.S. 923
(1950).

This Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. (Emphasis supplied).
The Covenant as a ratified treaty, would represent the supreme law of the land, nullifying any contrary state statutes
or constitutions. Since it is not self-executing, it would require
Congressional legislation to have binding domestic effect. Such
implementing legislation would also be supreme as to state law.
4.

Court Decisions and Other Authoritative Sources

The framers of our Constitution, providing for the prospect
of changing conditions by keeping the document flexible, set no
specific requirements as to the scope of the treaty power. Madison
said:
The object of treaties is the regulation of
intercourse with foreign nations and is external. I do not think it possible to enumerate all the cases in which such external
regulations would be necessary. Would it be
right to define all the cases in which Congress could exercise this authority? The
definition might and probably would be defective. They might be restrained by such a
definition from exercising the authority
where it could be essential to the interest
and safety of the community. It is most safe,
therefore, to leave it to be exercised so contingencies may arise. 1 07 (Emphasis supplied).
Consistent with this statement of policy, the treaty power has
generally been regarded as sufficiently broad and flexible to cover
all matters of genuine international concern, depending on the
changing world situation.1 0 8
The famous passage in Geofroy v.
Riggs

is still the best summation of the nature of the power,

though it was made nearly one hundred years ago.
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those
10/3 ELLIOTS DEBATES 514 (2d ed. 1836-1866).
1 0 8 McDougal
and Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World
Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Action, 14 LAW &
COMTEMP. PROB. 490, 516 (1949).
109133 U.S. 258 (1890).

restraints which are found in that instrument
against the action of the government or of its
departments, and those arising from the nature
of the government itself and of that of the
States.
It would not be contended that it
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids or a change in the character of
the government or in that of one of the States,
or a cession of any portion of the territory
without its consent... But with these exceptions,
it is not perceived that there is any limit to
the questions which can be adjusted touching
any matter which is properly the subject of negotations with a foreign country.1 1 0 (Emphasis
supplied).
The exceptions can be examined together. First, a treaty can
do nothing which the "Constitution forbids". This has long been a
recognized limitation on the power, although no treaty has ever
been held unconstitutional. I'I
The Covenant does not require such
unconstitutional acts. It does not attempt to establish a religion,
deny certain fundamental rights, or work a change in our representative form of government. Rather, the Covenant might change the
relative powers of the two levels of governments in otr system and
take away control over an area which has long been within the jurisdiction of the states. This result, according to critics, would
then come within the other major exception of "a change in the
character of the government of the United States".
This position, however, is fallacious. First, it has been
demonstrated that relatively few changes in control would be
necessary to equate existing present federal control to that called
for by the Covenant.1 1 2 A few minimal changes certainly should not
be classified as changes in the character of governments. The
argument also fails under the leading case of Missouri v. Holland. 1 1 3
In that case, an act of Congress had been adopted under the
"necessary and proper" clause to implement a treaty made with Great
Britain for the protection of migratory birds trave.ling between the
United States and Canada. Such protection had previously rested
in the hands of the individual states. The Court held that the
treaty power may be extended beyond the limits of the powers
expressly delegated to the Congress, when those powers are too
narrowly construed to permit effective action in matters of international concern. Justice Holmes summarized:
11UId at 267.
1 1 1 McDougal

et al, supra note 108,at 516.
ll2see notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
113- U.,S. 416 (1920).

It is obvious that there may be matters of
sharpest exigency for the national well-being
that an act of Congress could not deal with
but that a treaty followed by such an act
could, and it is not lightly to be assumed
that, in matters requiring national action,
a power which must belong to and somewhere
reside in every civilized government is not
to be found.ll*
With this foundation established, Holmes then met the basic argument that control over this area was a reserved power of the states
under the tenth amendment:
The only question is whether it (the treaty)
is forbidden by some invisible radiation from
the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We
must consider what this country has become in
deciding what that amendment has reserved..,No
doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but
a treaty may override its power... it is not sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance
is vain, and were it otherwise, the question
is whether the United States if forbidden to
acto 11 5 (Emphasis supplied).
This case speaks directly to the instant question. The main
objection, that of imposing federal control over an area which has
normally been within state control, is effectively removed by the
holding of the case regarding the tenth amendment. Even if this
power to control did rest in the states, a treaty could limit it.
Areas in which state regulation has been superseded by treaties
imposing federal regulation include debts owed to foreigners*,
title to land, I 1 7 escheat and inheritance, 1 1 8 statutes of limitations, 1 1 9 local taxation,120 administration of alien estates, 1 2 1
prohibitions against employment of foreign labor 1 2 2 and limitations
of pawnbrokerage to citizens. 1 2 3 Ratification and implementation of
the Covenant would add little to the already significant federal
presence in human rights protection.
ll4 1d at 433-34.
ii_5-d at 435°
1 1 6-egarding
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The words used by the Supreme Court to define the treaty
power--"properly the subject of negotiations with a foreign
country", 1 2 1"properly pertain to our foreign relations",Q
and "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude"--are
all sufficiently broad to permit inclusion of this Covenant.
These quotations establish basic guidelines. Whether certain
subject matters fit within those guidelines is often a matter
of emphasis or lack of emphasis. This appears to be the problem
with the Covenant, While opponents stress the "local" aspect
of human rights, such an approach should be rejected in view of
the gravity of the question and the need for more positive action,
as demonstrated dramatically by the troubling events of the last
several years in our own country. State action or inaction is
not enough, nor is pure federal action. Rather, the problem is
Ratification of the
global and requires global cooperation.
Covenant realistically and legally presents an opportunity for
such cooperation.
4.

Policy Considerations of Ratification

Although much discussion has centered around the "legalities"
of ratification, a more critical aspect involves basic policy
decisions. Several policies militate against ratification. One
relates to the fear that a step in this direction is dangerous
to the essential framework of the United States federal system.
This system has in recent decades been altered remarkably by
supreme court decisions and liberal interpretations of the
commerce clause and fourteenth amendment. If the treaty power
is used as proposed here it could be fatal to future state
effectiveness in major areas of government action. This would
contradict the historic ideals and value judgments that were the
keystone to the formation of our country.
Another negative policy argument is that there is simply no
need for additional legislation in this area. And, even if there
is greater need, it should be remedied by the people themselves
through their elected representatives. This is preferable to
reaching the same results by the indirect method of the treaty
power which can be used with approval of only two-thirds of
the Senate.
Another argument suggests that ratification would impose yet
another level of adjudicatory machinery and enforcement upon an
area where jurisdiction over serious civil rights problems is already confused. Moreover, there exists too much divergence in
international political, moral and social ideals to insure compliance with the provisions of the treaty. The United States
already insures these rights and thus most of the contents of the
12 4 Geofroy v. Riggs, supra note 110.
1257Santovincenzo v. Egan, supra note 118 at 40.
1 2 6 Missouri
v. Holland, supra note 114.

treaty would be directed to other countries, many of which do not
recognize or effectively protect the enumerated rights of the
Covenant.
Finally, there is the fear that in this extremely political
world, many Communist bloc countries would use United States
adherance to the treaty as a means to eiLLbarrass this country by
filing frivolous complaints in a process of constant harassment.
These negative policy considerations stem from the belief
that what other states think of our failure to ratify is really
irrelevant. In the end, they can see by our example that we are
leaders in protecting human rights domestically. "We should use
methods of persuasion, education, and example rather than formal
undertakings which commit some other country to accept our
'1
standards. 27
Most of the positive considerations relate to the position
which the United States, as the leader of the free world, should
take in an area of recognized international concern. The United
States has been conspicuously vocal in championing such rights
while, at the same time, conspicuously absent when called upon
to enter binding legal obligations to protect such rights. If
the United States wants to set the example and truly educate and
persuade others, as the negative side suggests, what better way
exists than to join this treaty? First, it would encourage the
participation of other nations, tentatively reluctant because of
the diminished chance of the Covenant's success without the major
powers. This would, in turn, encourage others on a regional
basis to enter into more human rights conventions for local protection. An example in point is the slow advancement of. the
Inter-American Covenant on Human Rights. Such drafts would
undoubtedly be adopted and made effective were the United States
to take the lead in urging participation in this type of activity.
Second, ratification would put the United States in a more
effective legal and moral position to protest infringement of
human rights by other countries. It took such a lead in the
Nuremberg Trials and an equally consistent position in the
Rhodesia question; but in other matters, its past reluctance
level has been of constant
to be legally bound on an 1 2international
8
embarrassment
diplomatic
IV.

CONCLUSION

Analysis of the legal and policy aspects of ratification
and recognition of the tremendous challenge which faces mankind
to insure the protection of basic human rights demands the
conclusion that the United States can and should ratify the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights along with the Optional
Protocol. This is true even though the Covenant has no article
1 2 1Duetche, Report of Standing Committee on Peace and Law
Through United Nations, 1 INT'L LAWYER 600, 620 (1967).
--2 Gardner, A Costly Anachronism, 53 ABA JOUR 907

(Oct 1967).

on federal states which would reduce the problems involved in
ratification. The lack of such a clause may not be critical to
ratification because, if the Senate has serious doubts concerning
possible unhealthy alterations of power in our federal system,
such doubts could be expressed in the form of a reservation to the
treaty given at the time of ratification. The reservation could
express the United States' acceptance and adoption of the principles
enumerated in the treaty and agreement to formulate such additional
legislation as may be necessary to meet the obligations specified.
Such legislation need not necessarily provide that the federal
government take over all protection of these rights.
Rather, backed
by authority of the treaty power, it could take the form of a
"federal reserve power" which would assure therest of the world
that, while most enforcement and protection would occur on the
state level, the federal government would stand ready to insure
compliance with the treaty in cases in which state acti6n is withheld
or mismanaged.
This suggestion meets the desires of both proponents and
critics of ratification. First, there is nothing in the treaty
which prohibits or discourages freedom of reservation to treaties
in accordance with the general rules of international law. Second,
such reservations would calm fears that the national government
would automatically take over the functions of the state in protection of human rights. Third, the reservation would signify to
the world that, while primary responsibility for human rights
protection in this country will rest with the states, the federal
government stands with reserve power through appropriate legislation to insure compliance with our international obligations.
Finally, ratification with reservations would permit the United
States to assume a role of leadership in the field of human rights
and, at the same time, maintain the primary functions of domestic
protection under state jurisdiction.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON THE
INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE--"THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
TO INSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL"

The Conference of European Jurists met in Strasbourg on
October 26-27, 1968, to consider legal means to protect the
individual in his relations with his state. To supplement
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this body published
the Conclusions and General Recommendations of that Conference.
Even a casual reading of the document reveals that the
Conference feels a substantial need for procedural safeguards
to protect the individual against the arbitrary, capricious,
or authoritarian acts of the state. The Recommendations suggest that the state limit its own power by creating or preserving independent institutions: an effective judiciary, an
agency to check administrative abuses, and possibly international organizations. Specifically, it enumerates - as
necessary safeguards - rights calculated to insure a fair
trial, procedures designed to limit the power of administrative
agencies, and controls planned to minimize the misuse of the
state's emergency powers.
The Conference proposes that an individual be able to
challenge government actions, especially infringements of his
rights, by judicial proceedings. To make this remedy meaningful, it should be readily available, inexpensive, simple,and
fast. Such standards.as a fair hearing, appellate review,
and an independent judiciary help insure just decisions. In
some instances the Conference's standards are more stringent
For example, the
than those required in the United States.
judge's appointment should be free from political influence
or patronage.

To check abuse of administrative Rower, the Conference
suggests the observance of certain minimum requirements when
the government adjudicates the rights of individuals. These
are quite similar to the requirements of due process in the
United States including the right of adequate notice and
access to evidence, the right to be heard, and the right to
counsel. Furthermore, the agency should give its reasons for
the administrative order, To insure that these safeguards
are maintained without the expense or complications of
judicial review, the administration itself should provide
adequate remedies and appellate procedure. The Conference
also suggests that there be within the administration an
agency desiYned to challenge and correct errors and abuses in
Such procedures would be in the state's own
the system.
IThis institution would be similar to the "Ombudsmen" now
operating to assist citizens in administrative processes in
Denmark, Great Britain, Finland, Guyana, New Zealand, Norway,
37
.Sweden, and Tanzania.

self-interest, since the Conference would hold a state responsible to its citizens for injuries caused by its negligent or
wrongful acts. The conference even implies that a state
should be liable for acts which cast on an individual a burden
which is unreasonable in relation to the rest of society.
Since the Conference contemplates that such responsibility be
secured by treaty, the resulting international obligation
would be far more onerous than those imposed on states by
current international law.
Nevertheless, the Conference recognizes that a state may
suspend many of an individual's rights during periods when the
executive must exercise its emergency powers. To prevent misuse of this authority, its exercise should be subject to the
confirmation of the legislature and control of the judiciary.
Unlike United States law, the Conference would not permit the
executive to suspend judicial review of arbitrary confinement.
The General Recommendations offer various methods of
implementing the above Conclusions. The Conference places
primary emphasis on a knowledgeable citizenry: essentials to
implementation are adequate education, a free press, elections
by secret ballot, and periodic review of legislation. Though
recognizing that responsibility rests squarely on the state,
the Conference suggests the possibility of international
supervision, especially on a regional basis. Final appeal
could rest with the proposed United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights. More immediately, the Conference urges every
country to sign and ratify various international covenants
dealing with human rights and to implement them with domestic
legislation.
J. P. W.

